UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 2 JOHNSTOWN DIVISION 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 Plaintiff, CASE NO: 3:14-cr-00023 ) 5 vs. 6 JOSEPH D. MAURIZIO, JR., 7 Defendant. 8 9 TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT PROCEEDINGS 10 BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIM R. GIBSON FEBRUARY 2, 2016 11 FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Stephanie L. Haines, AUSA 12 Amy Larson, AUSA 13 United States Attorney's Office Penn Traffic Building, Ste. 200 319 Washington Street 14 Johnstown, PA 15901 15 FOR THE DEFENDANT: 16 Steven P. Passarello, Esq. Daniel Kiss, Esq. Law Office of Steven P. Passarello 17 616 Hileman Street Altoona, PA 16601 18 19 20 21 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, 22 transcript produced with computer. 23 Kimberly K. Spangler, RPR, RMR United States District Court 2.4 Penn Traffic Building, Ste. 204 25 319 Washington Street Johnstown, PA 15901

I N D E X FEBRUARY 2, 2016 Defense Argument By Mr. Passarello 6, 25 Government Argument By Ms. Larson Certificate of reporter \* \* \* 

## PROCEEDINGS

(The proceedings convened on February 2, 2016, commencing at 10:00 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning. This is the time and place set for defendant Joseph D. Maurizio's motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence and an alleged violation of *Brady v. Maryland*, a Supreme Court case. This is Criminal Number 14-23.

The newly discovered evidence submitted by defendant is a statement by Erick in a victim impact statement dated September 20, 2015. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that a defendant must meet five requirements before he may be granted a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

First, the evidence must be, in fact, newly discovered. In other words, discovered since the trial.

Second, the facts must be alleged from which the Court may infer diligence on the part of the movant.

Third, the evidence relied upon must not be merely cumulative or impeaching.

Fourth, the evidence relied on must be material to the issues involved.

And, fifth, the evidence relied on must be such, and of such nature, as that on a new trial the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.

These requirements are set forth in the *United*States v. Iannelli 528 F.2d 1290, a 1976 Third Circuit Court

of Appeals case, and are routinely referred to as the *Iannelli*requirements.

Although the decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial lies within the discretion of the District Court, the movant has a heavy burden of proving each of these requirements. If just one of these requirements is not satisfied, a defendant's Rule 33 motion must fail. Courts should exercise great caution in setting aside a verdict reached after a fully-conducted proceeding, and particularly so where the action has been tried before a jury.

In your presentations, I urge each party to concentrate on the third and the fifth *Iannelli* requirements. The third requirement is that the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching. The fifth requirement is that the evidence relied on must be such, and of such nature, as that on a new trial the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.

With regard to the motion for new trial based upon an alleged Brady violation, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, a United States Supreme Court case, the government must provide a defendant with exculpatory material, including impeachment material that it either possesses or could obtain through due diligence.

To establish a *Brady* violation sufficient to warrant a new trial, a defendant must show, first, that the evidence was suppressed. Second, that the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant and, third, that the suppressed evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment.

Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

A showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal. Rather, the defendant must show that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.

In determining whether the defendant has established materiality, a court must evaluate the cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence.

In your presentations, I urge each party to concentrate on whether the evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment.

Originally, this day was scheduled for sentencing in this case. However, before the Court may move to sentencing, the issues before the Court with regard to motion

1 for new trial must be resolved. Since the parties were set to 2 be here today in any event, I scheduled the evidentiary 3 hearing in this case for today rather than pushing it back to a later date. 4 Are the parties ready to proceed? 5 6 MS. LARSON: Yes, Judge. 7 MR. PASSARELLO: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Mr. Passarello, this is your motion and I will permit you to make presentation first. 9 10 MR. PASSARELLO: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 May it please the Court, Counsel. First off, Your 12 Honor, I apologize for my voice if it breaks up. I've been 13 sick for about four days, so I'm trying to get over it. 14 THE COURT: As long as we can hear you that will be 15 fine. 16 MR. PASSARELLO: Okay. 17 This Court has laid out clearly what the issues 18 are, and I will address those the Court has requested. The 19 first motion before the Court is newly discovered evidence 20 under Rule 33. The Court has asked me to focus on whether 21 it's not merely cumulative or impeaching, and whether this 22 evidence is such a nature that it would probably produce a 23 different result at trial. 24 If the Court reads Rule 33 -- well, first let's

look at the statement. The statement is a statement from one

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of the linchpins of the United States' case, that being victim Erick. The whole entire case was a credibility case; would the jury believe the victims, the boys, or would they not. It clearly came down to credibility, and that is even addressed in Attorney Haines' closing argument.

The statement says this in answer to a question:

The question is, "Do you relate to people differently since
the crime. Please explain." Answer by Erick in his
handwriting in Spanish, and then translated correctly: "Yes.

Sometimes they think badly about me. Perhaps they think he
really abused me, but that was not the case."

That statement taken on its face is a contradiction to his testimony at trial, and clearly goes to his credibility.

Now let's talk about whether it's merely impeachment. If you look at the rule, Rule 33 indicates the fact that newly discovered evidence goes to impeachment does not mean that it cannot serve as the basis for a new trial. The real question to be asked is, is there a strong exculpatory connection between the newly discovered evidence and the evidence presented at trial. Or does the newly discovered evidence, though not in itself exculpatory -- which I would argue that this is -- throws severe doubt on the truthfulness of the critical inculpatory evidence that had been introduced at trial.

That's what this statement is. It is more than being impeachment, it's exculpatory. But even if the Court thinks it's simply -- it clearly causes severe doubt on critical and inculpatory evidence at trial.

And how do we know that? How do we know that?

Attorney Haines in her closing argument, in her rebuttal closing argument, said what? "Well, Mr. Passarello, he cross-examined Otoniel, he cross-examined Fredis, he cross-examined this guy and that guy. But he didn't cross-examine Erick, and that's on them." That's what she said. And she said, "You want to know why?" A quote from rebuttal: "Because Erick told you what happened, he told you the truth."

This evidence clearly goes to that inculpatory evidence that she tried to present. And it clearly contradicts that. Erick was their linchpin because we didn't have anything to cross-examine him on. He was their big witness. He corroborated allegedly Otoniel, much more than Luis did.

And to come in and then after trial in the testimony and under oath say, "Perhaps they think he abused me but he did not," I think clearly is newly discovered evidence that would command a new trial.

What they did here, Judge, what they did, is they usurped your role. They took a bullet from my defendant's gun

to constitutionally confront his witness and, more importantly, took away the jury's role on a critical piece of evidence to determine credibility. And I submit to the Court that by them doing that -- if the jury had heard that evidence -- now, I can't tell you, Judge, 110 percent if the jury had heard that evidence they would have changed their mind. But I can tell you this: The whole defense was "you believe him or you don't." That piece of evidence would cause doubt as to Erick's credibility.

Now, they can explain away all they want, well, you know what, Judge, that's not what he meant by abuse. You know what, Judge, we took another statement in November that changes that statement. That's irrelevant to this inquiry. They could have presented all that to the jury and the jury could have bought it. But the jury also could have bought that Erick was not telling the truth. And I submit, based upon newly discovered evidence, that it commands a new trial.

Second argument is the *Brady* argument which, in all fairness to this Court, I think is the strongest argument. It is clear that the United States government had this statement on September 20th, 2015, and did not advise the Court of it nor did they advise the defense counsel.

It is also crystal clear from their supplemental response, that they were so kind to have filed at 4:37 yesterday afternoon, that they were concerned about it.

1 Because if you read the affidavit, they got the statement, 2 they read it, the prosecution team called Agent Gamarra to 3 come and say, hey, what the heck is this statement. Agent Gamarra basically thinks it's a translation issue, we'll fix 4 5 it, realizes it's not. And Agent Gamarra is there sometime between September 20th and the 22nd, before the verdict comes 6 7 They're so concerned they send Agent Gamarra to the hotel 8 to talk to Erick. To say, Erick, what the heck do you mean? 9 What's going on here? 10 And all the while, we're getting ready to close, 11 they say nothing. We close before the charge, they say 12 nothing. You charge, you ask the defense counsel and the United States, anything for the record, they stand mute. 13 They 14 sit there and let the jury deliberate for two days, say 15 nothing. They sit there and listen to the verdict, say 16 nothing. 17 And why do they tell this Court they say nothing? 18 Because they determined that it wasn't Brady material. Well, 19 you know what? That ain't their call. That's not their call. 20 This evidence is clearly, clearly Brady material. 21 And how else do we know that they were so concerned

And how else do we know that they were so concerned about this statement? For some reason in the affidavit they filed, they sent Agent Gamarra in Honduras from Tegucigalpa to San Pedro Sula -- five hours -- on November 4th I believe, 2015, to take a new victim impact statement from Erick -- a

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statement that I have yet to even see -- to get a, quote/unquote, more accurate answer to that question. And the more accurate answer now is, How does it make you feel? Well, yes, perhaps people think he abused me, but that's because I put him in jail. Really? Are you kidding me? Evidence. First of all, I want to address the issue that they claim it's not Brady material, okay. That's absurd, okay. They mock me in their response by saying, well, I have no authority to cite this and I don't cite that. Well, you know, Brady and Giglio are pretty well known to everybody, but if they need a refresher course here's some authority. Evidence is -- it's Brady material -- Brady requires the government to provide evidence favorable to the accused. For Brady purposes, "evidence is favorable to the accused if it is either exculpatory or impeachable. See Strickler." Which this evidence is both. "If the information would be advantageous to the defense it is favorable to the accused. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668. Or if the evidence would tend to call the government's case into doubt it is favorable." "Evidence is favorable that is a question of substance and not degree. And evidence that has any affirmative evidentiary support for the defendant's case or any impeachment value is by definition favorable and Brady

material. See Strickler."

This evidence was not only impeaching but also was clearly favorable to the accused, and it clearly constitutes Brady material.

That doesn't end the inquiry. Was it suppressed?

I think clearly it was. It wasn't given. And they had knowledge of it and chose not to provide it.

So now we get to the crux. Was it material? "The suppression of evidence is prejudicial if the evidence was material for *Brady* purposes. Evidence is material if it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict. See *Kyles v. Whitley* 514 U.S. 419."

"To establish materiality, a defendant need not demonstrate that the disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in his acquittal. A reasonable probability exists if the government's evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. See *Bagley*."

"In evaluating materiality, we must focus on whether the withholding of the evidence undermines our trust in the fairness of the trial and the resulting verdict."

The Supreme Court case law also instructs that likely damage from suppression of evidence is best understood by reference to a prosecutor's closing argument.

This evidence is clearly material for Brady

purposes. It is a statement from a victim who testified in this trial, in his own handwriting and signed under declaration of perjury, that indicates the defendant did not abuse him. Done after he had already testified at trial that he committed those acts.

We know it was material because it was of such a concern to the government that they had Agent Gamarra go to the hotel and figure out what was going on. They had him then take another statement in Honduras on November 4th to change it to make it more accurate.

We also know that under the case law -- I ask the Court to look at the case law -- but when the case rises or falls on the credibility of witnesses, and when this witness is the linchpin of their case, it clearly makes that type of evidence material.

Again, the Supreme Court says look at the closings to know if it's material. Attorney Haines specifically said, "They cross-examined everybody, but they didn't cross-examine him, and that's on them. And why? Because he told you the truth." I can guaran-damn-tee you if I had that statement I would have crossed him, and the jury would have been allowed to hear it.

They usurped your authority. They took a bullet from my gun. And they took the jury's determination of credibility by not providing this statement.

I submit respectfully, Your Honor, that based upon -- look, sometimes things are just what they are. It is what it is, okay. And what this is is, you know, sometimes what's right is right and what's wrong is wrong. No matter how you slice it, this is wrong.

They should have given it to us. They should have at least made you aware of it. What was the harm? They could have called their agents to say, now, that's what Erick meant. They could have explained to the jury he doesn't understand what abuse means, or he changed his statement. But they took away from me the right to challenge his credibility and argue to that jury that he was not telling the truth. And that was my whole defense.

I don't care how you slice it. And I understand that -- obviously, I think I've laid out the arguments for this Court -- but what's right is right and what's wrong is wrong. And this is just plain wrong.

Thank you.

THE COURT: For the United States.

MS. LARSON: Good morning, Judge. As the Court noted as we started here today, this is the defendant's burden on both of the issues that he now advances before the Court. Both whether or not there was, in fact, a Brady violation and the much more onerous standard of, if so, whether or not he's entitled to a new trial based on this or based upon what he

asserts is newly discovered evidence.

Now, he's failed to meet his burden here on either of the arguments he raises today because he's failed to offer any support for what he is offering to the Court. For his interpretation of what a single statement taken completely out of context of a five-page document, which he conveniently ignores the substance of that statement, what that means.

Again, without any evidence that he's placed in the record that supports any of his arguments that he makes before the Court today.

It should also be noted that it was not the defendant who asked for an evidentiary hearing today, but rather the Court who suggested it and, in fact, set it for a hearing today.

So when we boil this down what do we have, Judge? We have a single statement which Mr. Passarello read into the record, taken completely out of context in which it was given. In his pleadings there's absolutely no factual support for his assertion that this is, in fact, a recantation by one of the government's victims, or that he has changed his testimony in any sort of material way.

There's absolutely no basis for any of his assertions or for any of him standing up here and pontificating and, quite frankly, repeatedly pointing at the prosecution table in a manner that's inappropriate and

unprofessional.

But what did Mr. Passarello have in the discovery materials prior to the start of the trial, which were turned over on September 4th in a production of Jencks material, as well as any and all outstanding discovery materials? He had materials which directly contradict the argument he's asking this Court to swallow without any support, and which corroborate the sworn affidavits which have been submitted by the two government witnesses; that being Jackie Goldstein and Special Agent Carlos Gamarra. He had in his position an ROI, Number 79, which was produced to him on September 4th -- which was days before the trial started, days before any of the witnesses testified -- regarding an interview conducted with the victim witness, who in that ROI is referred to as Number Four, but he's clearly victim minor Number Three, who is Ludin.

And the allegations that were the basis of the charges related to Minor Victim Number Three are Counts 4 and 5 of the indictment. And that was based on allegations made by Ludin that on at least two occasions -- once when he was 15 and once when he was 16 -- he was anally penetrated by the defendant, as well as on witness statements, such as Luis and others, that they had observed Ludin anally penetrating the father.

Now, as this Court is well aware, by the time Ludin

came to court to testify, the defendant's investigator had already prompted what the government argued was a false recantation through their videotaped interview of him, repeated interviews, where they only produced a portion of that to the government.

So when he was questioned by the government on September 1st, 2015, Ludin made a statement that, "I never abused Maurizio the priest, and he never abused me." In that context "abuse" is anal penetration. "I never abused him, he never abused me." Those were the allegations with respect to that victim. Which is very different than the allegations that were ever in play with respect to Minor Victim Number Two, Erick.

So he had this information which, once again, retrial completely undercuts the whole argument he asks the Court to swallow, and corroborates all of the statements that are in the government's original response with Jackie Goldstein's affidavit, sworn affidavit, as well as in our supplemental response in the affidavit of Carlos Gamarra.

So turning first, Judge, there was absolutely no factual support for the defendant's argument that there was a Brady violation here. Again, nothing in the record before this Court that meets either of the requirements necessary for a Brady violation.

Again, the disclosure of a single statement in a

five-page victim impact statement, which was based on a misunderstanding regarding a nonlegal, ambiguous, broad term such as "abuse" is simply not -- when coupled with all of the remaining statements in the victim impact statement -- again four pages worth -- in which Erick methodically details the impact of the crimes which the defendant perpetrated against him. Which is the sole purpose of a victim impact statement, not evidence of the defendant's guilt, to discuss the impact of the crime on the victim, which he did.

He outlines how the crime has, in fact, affected him and his family, how people are thinking. Or he's worried people think he's gay, which is again corroborated by all of the other testimony, including the experts on both sides of this case. But that's a very real fear when young boys are assaulted by adult male perpetrators.

And again he discusses the fear, the grief, the depression, the repeated memories of the crime, as well as the ongoing emotional consequences he's suffered by the defendant's criminal conduct perpetrated against him.

So when you take that entire five-page statement it's clearly not favorable evidence to the defense. But even if the Court were to find that the evidence were favorable to the defense, there's no Brady violation because under the standard it is simply not material. Evidence is material only if there's a reasonable probability, as the Court has noted,

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that had it been disclosed the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Again, it's the defendant's burden of showing this reasonable probability of a different outcome, one that is sufficient to undermine the confidence in this verdict. And there's absolutely no factual support for his assertions that had this victim impact statement been produced and the one statement at issue had been disclosed that the trial would have ended in an acquittal.

In order to make that finding of fact, in order to make the conclusions of law that would require this Court to ignore or overlook or otherwise disregard far, far too many things, you would have to read that one statement, Judge, in a vacuum and ignore the rest of Erick's victim witness statement that are contained within the four corners of that document. You would have to find the sworn statements in the affidavits of Jacqueline Goldstein and Carlos Gamarra not credible and not part of the record. You would have to find that this ambiguity and what abuse means, and the fact that it is open to interpretation was not immediately rectified by the prosecution, that we were determined to make that decision, and that there was, in fact, no Brady material. It was not exculpatory, nor was it Giglio, nor was it anything different than what Erick has consistently alleged since 2009, when these allegations first arose.

The Court would have to ignore the entirety of Erick's sworn unchallenged, uncontroverted testimony at trial, as well as all of the corroborated evidence of all of the other government witnesses.

Remember, Judge, they can call him a linchpin.

They can call him whatever they would like. He's a victim.

He's a victim of illicit sexual conduct perpetrated against him by the defendant when he was only 15 years old.

But he was not the only witness to that conduct.

Luis testified he viewed the defendant fondling Erick's genitals. Erick's always maintained that that's exactly what happened, and both affidavits before the Court indicate that he has never once recanted those allegations nor has he changed his allegations of the acts perpetrated against him by the defendant at all. Not at all during the pendency of this investigation or prosecution.

The Court would also have to overlook the forensic evidence in this case, including the images found on his computer, which a jury determined were child pornography. As well as all the EXIF data showing that the defendant repeatedly photographed these children in various states of undress, including holding their shirts up because he directed them to do so -- Erick testified to that -- to expose their chest, to expose their abdomen.

The Court would have to overlook all of the

photographic evidence that led up and exactly corroborated

Erick and Luis's testimony of the events of the day that lead

to the defendant's criminal conduct perpetrated against not

one but two minor victims.

The Court would have to ignore the testimony of both expert witnesses, which corroborated the victim's testimony in various aspects about the way in which they reacted to the sexual abuse that they suffered, as well as all the documentary evidence, the defendant's travel records, his passports, all physical evidence recovered from his home, as well as various stipulations that are in evidence, and the defendant's own statements made in e-mails that he was not worried about sexual abuse allegations, not because they hadn't occurred but because he was convinced he'd get away with it because the victims, by that point, would be over the age of 18. We've cited that trial exhibit for the Court's consideration.

Given that the defendant has failed to meet his burden showing that this is in no way material evidence because there's no way that the disclosure of one single statement would have drastically altered or given a reasonable probability for acquittal here, he has not made his burden and so that motion at least with respect to the Brady allegation should be denied.

As the Court has cited, because he can't meet the

materiality under *Brady*, he also cannot prevail under the requirements for a new trial for newly discovered evidence.

As the Court has noted, this is an even more stringent standard, a heavy burden for the movant, which he has simply failed to meet.

He must prove all of the five requirements. And again, he asserts absolutely no factual support, nothing in the record to show that this newly discovered evidence, which again, is one statement, one in a multi-page document, that includes tons of inculpatory answers and information provided by the victim, how that in any way would change the outcome of this trial and that there would be a probability of an acquittal.

As the Court's noted, he fails to establish at least three of the requirements necessary for a new trial. We've addressed materiality. But first the fact that Erick responded the way he did to that single question, based on an erroneous belief to an ambiguous nonlegal term such as "abuse," that that did not, in fact, include touching where Erick believed that that only included anal penetration, that's impeachment evidence at best. At best it's impeachment evidence. So under the progeny of case law that is not sufficient to warrant the defendant a new trial.

And he's not provided, again, a shred of factual support for that final requirement that that newly discovered

evidence, which again boils down to one single sentence, is of such nature that it would have produced an acquittal at trial.

Again, Judge, when you take this sentence in the context in which it was given, when it was given, all of the other answers given by Erick, it is completely clear that Erick was victimized by this defendant.

You have the affidavit of Jackie Goldstein saying at no point did she consider this to be a recantation because it was consistent with Erick's distinction between anal penetration and the abuse the defendant perpetrated against the other boys, and what he had experienced, which to Erick, what he disclosed, what he testified to at court, was simply fondling of the genitals. Erick drew that distinction.

That was then verified on the day after the statement was produced by Carlos Gamarra, who again went to clear up any possible ambiguity of the term "abuse." That was the sole purpose of that. And he did so. Again, Erick stated to Carlos Gamarra -- which you have a sworn affidavit -- that he did not understand that the term "abuse" could include touching, that he defined it as solely penetration. Which as we've now established, Ludin did as well.

Again, the testimony of Erick -- while

Mr. Passarello wants to call him a linchpin -- of course he

was an important piece of the puzzle. He testified about the

acts of sexual contact that he suffered at the hands of the

defendant, the various illicit sexual conduct that he endured, which the defendant offered him and, in fact, gave him money to perpetrate against this young boy. His testimony again is buttressed by all the other evidence in this case. This does not stand alone. There was a witness to this abuse. There was photographic evidence. There was forensic evidence on the computer. All of those things which buttress Erick's testimony.

So it seems clear that the defendant's motion for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence must be denied as well, Judge. So for all of these reasons we would ask that you deny both of the defendant's motions, as he has clearly failed to meet his burden.

Additionally, Judge, I would note for the record that Mr. Passarello indicated he had not received the victim impact statement on November 5th. That is in direct contradiction to an e-mail he sent to a legal assistant at the United States Attorney's Office that he had received our filings, which included two affidavits, yesterday.

Additionally, when Erick was provided by Agent
Gamarra on November 5th, 2015, as noted in Agent Gamarra's
affidavit, "The point of this meeting was to review the victim
impact statement in its entirety to ensure that all of the
answers were accurate." As stated in Agent Gamarra's sworn
affidavit, which is uncontroverted, "At that point Erick

1 indicated that all of the answers on his victim impact 2 statement were accurate, except one: The one in which he indicated that he had "not really been abused." And so he was 3 able to answer that question in a way he felt was accurate. 4 5 And he says, "that sometimes people think badly of me, perhaps because he is in jail because of me, " because of the testimony 6 7 that Erick gave at trial under oath which the defense chose 8 not to cross-examine him. That was their strategic error, and 9 they now don't get a second bite of the apple by not meeting 10 their burden on the two issues that they brought before the 11 Court today. 12 Thank you. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Passarello, do you have rebuttal? 14 MR. PASSARELLO: Just briefly, Your Honor. 15 First of all, I want to address what I said to this 16 Court was that I did not receive what I believe to be a new 17 victim impact statement taken by Agent Gamarra on 18 November 4th, 2015. Attorney Larson, as she always likes to 19 do, cleared that up. I guess there's not a new victim impact 20 statement. But it's -- they had it, they hid it, and they got 21 caught. And now they're backpedaling. That's what this 22 argument is. They cheated and they got caught. 23 How anybody can look this Court in the eye and say 24 a victim who says, "perhaps people think he abused me but he 25 did not" is not material to a case where they say he abused

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    them is unbelievable. That clearly is material. And yes,
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    Your Honor, I did -- what I have is the statement. That's my
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    evidence. That's the statement. And it's your job and it's
    your sole discretion to determine whether or not that
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    statement is and of itself material.
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               That's my evidence. They had it. I can show they
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    had it. I can show they didn't disclose it. I can show all
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    of that. But this case is about credibility. If I have a
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    statement from somebody who says something different than what
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    they said on the stand, how in Sam Hill is that not material?
    How can that be? How can that be?
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               This clearly is material evidence. This clearly
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    should have -- what should have happened is on September 20th,
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    they should have come into this court on the 21st in the
    morning and said, Judge, we got an issue with this statement.
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    Here it is. I'm here to answer any questions you may have.
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    Do what you will with it. They didn't. They didn't. And
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    they didn't because they decided, "Nah, I'm not giving it to
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    them. It's not material." It's not their call. I can't
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    believe they come in here and say it's not material.
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               But anyway, Judge, I believe we've met our burden.
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    It is a statement that contradicts -- and it's odd, isn't it,
    that Mr. Gamarra went on November 4th, 2015, and Erick assured
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    him that every single answer in that victim witness impact
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    statement was correct, except for the one statement I'm
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     alleging.
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               I have nothing further.
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               THE COURT: Counsel, anything further?
               MS. LARSON: No, Judge.
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               THE COURT: All right. Just one moment.
               (Off-the-record discussion between the Court and
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    Law Clerk Savino.)
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               THE COURT: Attorney Larson, just so I'm certain as
     to what occurred back on September 20th, 2015, the victim
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     impact statement was completed that day and signed by Erick.
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               Now, was it reviewed by you?
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               MS. LARSON: It was not, Judge.
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               THE COURT: Who reviewed it?
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               MS. LARSON: Judge, it was in Spanish. One of the
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    things we pointed out with our memo was that Mr. Passarello
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    erroneously asserts that the victim assistant specialist wrote
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    it down in English. And at that point that was not the case.
    It was documented in Spanish. Erick did not write the
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    statement. Erick did not read the statement. The questions
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    were read to him.
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               The Court is very aware of the background of these
                So the decision was made that the statements would
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    young men.
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    be read to them, and their answers would be provided verbally
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    and documented by Jacqueline Goldstein, and that's what
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    happened.
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They then had to be sent to the U.S. Attorney's
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    Office for official translation. When they were translated
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     into English I reviewed the victim impact statements. At that
    point was when that was determined there was an ambiguity with
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    what he meant by "abuse." It's unclear. At that point Agent
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    Gamarra, being fluent in Spanish as his affidavit attests to,
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    went on that very day to talk to Erick, and this explanation
8
    was given --
               THE COURT: Well, just wait for a moment.
9
10
     started on September 20th.
11
               MS. LARSON: That's correct, Judge.
12
               THE COURT: Erick was interviewed and orally gave
13
    these answers; is that correct?
14
               MS. LARSON: That's correct, Judge.
15
               THE COURT: Then it was transcribed in Spanish on
16
    the victim impact statement?
17
               MS. LARSON: That's correct, Judge.
18
               THE COURT: And then he signed it?
19
               MS. LARSON: That's correct.
20
               THE COURT: And when did that process end?
21
               MS. LARSON: That was in the evening hours of
22
     September 20th, Judge.
23
               THE COURT: When did you first see the statement?
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               MS. LARSON: Judge, I believe that I saw it on
25
     September 22nd. However, while I want to be 100 percent clear
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     in everything that we've communicated to the Court, which is
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    why in Carlos Gamarra's affidavit, we're saying it was the
    21st or the 22nd. The earliest it could have been would have
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    been the afternoon of the 21st, after the jury was charged,
 4
 5
    because we were in court all morning and, in fact, returned to
    court for the charge after lunch. So there's no way that
 6
 7
    these statements would have been translated or reviewed prior
8
    to the afternoon or evening hours of the 21st. And I believe
9
     that they were first reviewed on the 22nd, which is when Agent
10
     Gamarra had the conversation with Erick clearing up this
11
    ambiguity.
12
               THE COURT: Well, then the Homeland Security people
13
    were the ones who first became aware of the contents of this
14
    victim impact statement?
15
               MS. LARSON: That's correct.
16
               THE COURT: And did they report to you or to
17
    Attorney Haines -- and I'll let her speak for herself -- but
18
     if you know, that's fine. Did they report to you that it had
19
     this statement in there that Mr. Passarello is referring to?
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               MS. LARSON: Absolutely not, Judge. And as
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    contained, again, in the sworn affidavit of Jackie Goldstein,
    based on the hundreds of hours she had spent with him -- with
22
23
    Erick -- as well as her hours and training and experience as a
24
    victim assistant specialist, she did not note anything unusual
25
    about Erick's response. She did not view it as a recantation.
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     She viewed it as being in conformity with what he had already
 2
     said.
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               THE COURT: Well, regardless of how she viewed it,
    when did she become aware of it?
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               MS. LARSON: Well, Erick made the statements in her
 6
    presence on the 20th, Judge. But I believe that your question
7
    was did she then communicate to the members of the prosecution
8
     team, and the answer is no.
9
               THE COURT: When did you first learn about it?
10
               MS. LARSON: When the English versions were
11
    provided. And, again, the earliest that could have been was
12
     the evening hours of -- afternoon, evening hours of the 21st.
     I believe it was the morning of the 22nd, but I can't say for
13
14
     100 percent certain, which is why the dates in the affidavit
15
    are as they are.
16
               THE COURT: So it was presented to you in English?
17
               MS. LARSON: That's correct, Judge.
18
               THE COURT: Did you read it?
19
               MS. LARSON: In English, Judge. My Spanish is not
20
    good enough to read the victim impact statements in Spanish.
21
               THE COURT: And when you read that, did you not
    note that it at least could be Brady material?
22
23
               MS. LARSON: Judge, I didn't know what Erick meant
24
    by that statement.
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               THE COURT: Well, regardless of what he meant --
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often we don't know what people mean -- but it was written out clearly, as Mr. Passarello has read it today. Regardless what Erick meant, the fact that that had been stated and put on the paper, would that not be Brady material because it would be helpful to the defense at that point? MS. LARSON: Well, while, again, the Court may find that it's favorable, I don't see that as Brady. I do not find that as exculpatory material. And I don't see it certainly as rising to the materiality aspects that would render it a Brady violation. THE COURT: Well, let's not mix the fact of whether it's Brady with whether it's material; those are two separate issues. I am asking you, Would you not agree that it certainly would appear to be favorable to the defense, regardless of what Erick believed it meant? I mean to me, it is pretty clear that this is favorable to the defense. I don't think there is -- I don't see how you can say it isn't favorable to the defense. It is. Now, whether it is material is a separate issue, and that is why I told you to concentrate on that particular aspect of the Brady. But, quite frankly, I don't see how it could be read as anything other than favorable to the defendant, so I want to know when you knew about it.

MS. LARSON: Again, Judge, the earliest I would

have known was when it was translated into English. I cannot give the Court an exact time, which is why it's the 21st or the 22nd, and the conversation was with Erick immediately thereafter.

THE COURT: I don't know what Erick meant by that. You don't know what Erick meant by that. You now have his version of what he meant. But could not Mr. Passarello have used that in terms of "you said this, did you not?" Then he could explain what he meant.

But would that not be favorable to the defense?

MS. LARSON: At the point -- again, this was given after Erick's sworn testimony, after the parties had rested.

Now, in the situation in which the Court is saying could Mr. Passarello have cross-examined him and said, Did you make what amounts to an inconsistent statement, Erick would have been able to say yes or no and given an explanation.

If, in fact, it was an inconsistent statement, we're talking about impeachment. Which, again, if this evidence is solely for impeachment it does not rise to the level of getting a new trial.

THE COURT: Well, again, you are going to the materiality issue. I am asking you about the responsibility of the prosecution to provide Brady material, not to view whether it would change the outcome of the trial. That is not the issue. The issue is should it not have been provided.

MS. LARSON: Judge, again, we immediately clarified this ambiguity. And because of that and because the content of the rest of the statement, which clearly indicated it was consistent with the fact that Erick had been victimized by the defendant, no, we did not view this as favorable information. We did not view it as Brady material.

We are aware of our obligations, and had we viewed it that way it would have been immediately produced. Had there been a recantation, had there been any sort of testimony or statements made to any member of the prosecution team which demonstrated an inconsistency in what Erick was saying then versus his sworn testimony, absolutely that would have been documented and turned over.

As this Court is aware, and as we just put on the record regarding the ROI, Number 79 of Ludin's recantation, that was documented and immediately turned over, consistent with our obligations.

This was not done to take a bullet out of Mr. Passarello's gun nor was it done to hide anything. There was no nefarious intent, period.

THE COURT: Well, please keep in mind, I am differentiating between whether for purposes of a new trial this is material. I separate that from whether or not this is Brady material or Giglio material, and I don't quite understand how you could not view this as favorable to the

1 defendant. Having said that, that doesn't answer the issue of 2 whether there should be a new trial or not, which is a 3 separate issue. Attorney Haines, are you basically on the same page 4 5 with Attorney Larson as to when you learned about this? 6 MS. HAINES: I am, Your Honor. I was present with 7 Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And you say that when this Homeland 9 Security person went back and discussed this with Erick, that 10 Erick clarified or changed his answer to that particular 11 inquiry? 12 MS. LARSON: That's correct, Judge. As detailed in 13 the affidavit of Carlos Gamarra in Paragraphs 10 and 11, this 14 details when the issue was first brought to Agent Gamarra's 15 attention, that he immediately went to speak with Erick, asked 16 him what did he mean when he said, That perhaps people think 17 he was "really abused," and perhaps that -- and that's not the 18 case. He was asked what he meant by that. 19 Erick gave the explanation, as he had many times, 20 and consistent with Jacqueline Goldstein's understanding, He 21 did not penetrate me, as he had with the other boys. Abuse 22 means penetration, consistent with the way the other boys 23 viewed it, so therefore, he didn't abuse me. 24 As Carlos Gamarra detailed in that affidavit in

Paragraph 11 when it was explained to him that in the U.S. we

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     consider abuse to include touching of the genitals, Erick said
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    he did not know that. He said he didn't understand, and under
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     that definition yes, he was abused. At that point, that
     information was immediately relayed back to the case agent and
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     the other members of the prosecution team.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Passarello, anything further?
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               MR. PASSARELLO: No, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Attorney Larson or Attorney Haines,
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     anything further?
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               MS. LARSON: No, Judge.
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               MS. HAINES: No, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Then do either of you have any evidence
    to present as opposed to oral argument?
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               MS. HAINES: Your Honor, we have attached as
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     government exhibits onto our initial response, as well as our
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     supplemental response, the affidavits that have been referred
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     to here today of Jacqueline Goldstein and Special Agent
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    Gamarra.
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               If the Court would like a copy of those appended to
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     this proceeding as Government Exhibit Number 1 and Government
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    Exhibit Number 2 we would be happy, or if the Court is fine
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    with just using what has been attached to the previous filings
23
    of the United States, we're happy to do whatever the Court
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    would request in this proceeding.
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THE COURT: Well, documents that have already been

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1 docketed as a part of pleadings and responses and motions need 2 not be presented again today. 3 MS. HAINES: We would ask for them to be incorporated herein then. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Well, I am not going to 6 rule from the bench on this. I would like to analyze it 7 thoroughly before coming to a conclusion, and we will do that. 8 Then depending on what the decision is, we will schedule 9 further proceedings in accordance with that finding. 10 We will be in recess until call of Court. 11 (Proceedings concluded at 10:55 a.m.) \* \* \* 12 13 14 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 15 I, Kimberly K. Spangler, Federal Official Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the 16 Western District of Pennsylvania, do hereby certify that 17 pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the 18 stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter, and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference 19 of the United States. 20 Dated this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_ 2016 21 22 23 KIMBERLY RUSHLOW SPANGLER, RPR, RMR 2.4 FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 25